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Abstract
This paper is concerned with investigating the information content of
undisclosed limit orders, and identifying factors that affect their size, plus
the examination of the brokers’ behaviour in using undisclosed orders. We
adopt a sample of liquid stocks listed on the ASX, and our estimation results
indicate that the size of undisclosed orders are affected by a number of
factors. Given the ‘stealth trading’ pattern of behaviour observed in large
disclosed orders, this paper provides evidence to support a similar pattern of
behaviour in the case of undisclosed orders. Our model also provides an
appropriate measure for estimating the size of undisclosed orders.
Keywords:

Undisclosed limit orders; ARMA model; liquidity; volatility

JEL Classification: C2; G12
Acknowledgements: This paper has benefited from collaborative research
work with the equity research department of Salomon Smith Barney in
Sydney on a sample of ASX stocks.

1.

Introduction
Given the increasing use of automated trading systems by stock exchanges, liquidity

and transparency have nowadays become two essential qualities for operators of financial
markets to consider. From the markets’ point of view, liquidity means the ability for a trader
to buy or sell any amount of stocks immediately and at a price not far way from the current
market price (Black (1971)). It is the element in market microstructure that has received much
attention and research on it has made remarkable advances at both the theory level (see Kyle
(1985), Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Papermen (1996)) and empirical level (O’Hara (1995),
Engle and Defour (1998), etc.). The other important feature of a trading system is market
transparency1, defined by O’Hara (1995) as the ability of market traders to observe trading
information during the trading process, where information can refer to knowledge about
current or past prices, quotes, volume, the source of order flow, the identities and motivations
of market participants (Madhavan (1996)). Of all these dimensions of transparency, the issue
concerning the disclosure of information on quotes and transactions have been central to
regulation debates. Biais (1993) argues that quotation transparency will increase market
efficiency and increase liquidity. Lyons (1994) states that the lack of trade disclosure causes
excess volatility in the foreign exchange market. According to the microstructure theory, the
greater the chance of trading with an informed trader, the higher the market maker sets his
next bid and ask spread. Therefore, if a lower bid and ask spread is observed in the market, it
means that the informed traders are hiding themselves well amongst liquidity traders,
exploiting the potential benefit from the superior information they possess. Madhavan (1995)
argues that block trade brokers and institutional investors who are generally more informed
than the other market traders prefer trading in lower transparency markets in order to conceal
their information advantage and also to protect themselves from the large price impact cost
that is partially caused from the high bid and ask spread.
In order-driven markets that electronic order book systems prevail, and traders are
requested to offer liquidity to the system by submitting limit orders as an indication that they
are willing to trade. These traders are called liquidity suppliers. Then the liquidity demanders,
the counterparty of liquidity suppliers, submit market orders for immediate execution in
response to trading opportunities liquidity suppliers give them. To be successful, stock
exchanges must encourage liquidity suppliers to publicly display their limit orders so that
liquidity demanders can be attracted. The profit that comes from the premium between the
market price and limit price liquidity suppliers specify is paid by liquidity demanders for an
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immediate execution2. In the meantime, however, liquidity suppliers expose themselves to
the risk of trading with better informed traders and parasitic traders such as front runners,
squeezers, quote matchers and so on, see Harris (1997) for details. Therefore, while enhancing
their market transparency of limit orders for liquidity offer, order-driven system exchanges as
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), the Paris Bourse and the Toronto Stock Exchange
have compiled rules to protect traders from unnecessary order exposure. That traders are
allowed to submit undisclosed orders is one of these rules. In other words, brokers are allowed
to enter limit orders to the trading system with part or total quantity of this order not revealed
to the market participants. Nevertheless, most stock exchanges require a minimum value for
submitting an undisclosed order, for instance, for stocks listed on the ASX the total value of
an order has to be no less than AUD$200,000 to be entered as an undisclosed order.
Undisclosed orders that allow traders to show other market participants only a part of
the total quantity they wish to trade are becoming a frequently used means by stock brokers
and institutional traders to avoid substantial exposure of their trading intentions. Previously
several studies have considered the use of undisclosed orders with respect to order exposure
(Harris, 1996, 1997)) and the response of market movements after undisclosed orders
submission (Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001)). However, when it comes to more specific
questions of what determines the size of an undisclosed order and what process brokers take
to submit the undisclosed limit orders, we need a further investigation into the variables that
are related to undisclosed orders. This paper provides explanations to some of these issues in
the analysis of market factors that affect the use and the size of the undisclosed orders in an
Autoregressive Moving Average framework, as applied to ASX data.
Many previous studies have found a positive relationship between the absolute value of
price changes and trading volume3, so in this ARMA model, the absolute price change from
the last close price and the last five minutes are incorporated to measure the long-term and
short-term volatility of price movements prior to the submission of an undisclosed order. In
the meantime, an appropriately specified model should also capture the change in liquidity
that has an impact on the size of undisclosed orders, the time of the day effect, the degree of
information existing, and the trading pattern of the individual broker. A detailed description of
each variable used to capture these factors is provided in the next section.
Through the analysis of undisclosed orders in this paper, we have also analysed the
patterns that are followed by brokers in their submission of undisclosed orders on stock
markets. As there is a minimum value requirement for the submission of undisclosed orders,
the undisclosed orders are most often used by block traders and institutional investors who
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trade stocks in large quantities. The behaviour of block traders and institutional investors has
been the focus of Chan and Lakonsishok (1993, 1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1996).
Recent studies by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) on block trades have found evidence that
block traders and institutional investors prefer to break up a large orders into smaller sized
orders before entering the market. This is explained as a strategy used by block traders to
protect them from the various risks of trading with parasitic traders, see Harris (1997).
Barclay and Warner (1993) have found evidence on the US stock market that medium size
trades mostly drive price movements. The examination of how and under what conditions
block traders use undisclosed orders to hide their large positions as an alternative strategy in
the market gives a better understanding of institutional traders’ behaviour from a different
angle that has not been explored before. Moreover, as we focus on examining the patterns
revealed in entering and dealing with undisclosed orders from an individual stockbroker’s
point of view, the explicit estimation of current undisclosed order size associated with
previous undisclosed orders entered by the same broker provides important implications for
predicting the size of the undisclosed orders.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two outlines the
institutional framework of the ASX and the data set we are using in the model. Section three
illustrates our modelling methodology and implements the model specified and the variables.
Section four presents the results we obtain, giving explanations and implications and section
five concludes the paper.
2.

Market Description and the Data
The automatic order driven markets have their own electronic screen-trading system, for

instance, the Australian Stock Exchange uses the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System
(SEATS) for stock trading. The SEATS provides an order-driven market where matched bids
and asks entered based on price time priority can be automatically executed. SEATS screen
places unexecuted limited orders in a queue in sequence of price and time with quote details
displayed publicly: trade type (bid/ask), price, broker number and quantity. Brokers have the
option to hide their quantity if the total value of the order is above a level of the undisclosed
order threshold. The quantity of an undisclosed order may also be partially disclosed and
partially undisclosed, provided the undisclosed portion is at least the size of the undisclosed
order threshold. On the ASX the undisclosed order has precedence over disclosed order given
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the same price, and as soon as the undisclosed quantity falls below the threshold during the
course of trades, the full order quantity becomes disclosed.
Using Australian intra-day data, Aitken, Brown and Walter (1996) show that in 1993
about 6% of orders on the ASX are undisclosed accounting for approximately 28% of the
volume. On the French market D’Hondt, Winne and Francois-Heude (2001) find that 14% of
limit orders are not totally disclosed, which account for 45% of the proposed volume.
Moreover, for those partially disclosed orders, the undisclosed portion is increasing with the
total order size, with roughly more than 70% of orders hiding more than 70% of the total
number of shares. In a cross-sectional framework, Berkman, Aitken and Mak (2001) find that
the use of undisclosed orders of a stock increases with the volatility that is measured by the
average daily high-low spread as a fraction of the price. In this paper we undertake a timeseries study for ASX stocks to explicitly examine the impact of market volatility and
excessive trading volume on the size of undisclosed orders.
The data is provided by the Security Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).
It includes detailed order submission information as the order initiator, the price, the disclosed
and undisclosed quantity, the entry time, and the broker ID of the broking house who enters
the order for a period of three months from December 4th 2000 to February 26th 2001. Then
those orders in our sample having undisclosed quantities are pulled out to form a new sample
of undisclosed orders for further investigation. After this filtering approximately 2500
observations are included in the sample, with 57.3% bids and 43.7% asks. In order to
eliminate the influence of abnormal trading activity during the opening and closing of the
market (Engle and Russell (1998)), this study only examines orders submitted between 10:30
am and 3:30 pm when market is considered at its normal continuous trading stage. Moreover,
an undisclosed order is counted only at the time when it is entered, so any amendment,
expiration and deletion of this order is not considered nor included. This is to avoid repeated
computation of orders and excessively unnecessary autocorrelation in the data sets.
For further investigation and model estimation, we have chosen three stocks listed on
the ASX that have the greatest number of undisclosed orders entered and do not go exdividend during the sample period. These three stocks are BHP, NAB and TLS from resource,
banking and telecommunications sector, respectively. The order details of these stocks are
presented in Table 1 below.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Undisclosed Volume and Price
BHP

NAB

TLS

Buying Side:
Undiscl.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Undiscl.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Undiscl.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Mean

52,790

1.20%

23,967

0.85%

229,074

1.29%

Min.

5,830

0.13%

3,500

0.12%

14,300

0.08%

Max.

499,999

11.34%

200,000

7.12%

1,100,000

6.20%

Std. Dev.

73,156.3

34,642.4

216,879.1

Selling Side:
Undis.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Undis.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Undis.
Size

As % of
Daily Vol.

Mean

63,036

1.43%

53,847

1.92%

154,096

0.87%

Min.

5,000

0.11%

3,500

0.12%

14,435

0.08%

Max.

500,000

11.34%

500,000

17.81%

3,000,000

16.91%

Std. Dev.
Daily Trading Vol:

106,365.4
4,409,763

97,231.4
2,807,871

253,720.8
17,737,877

Notes: the Undis. Vol. represents the size of the undisclosed order for each stock. The Daily Vol. is
calculated as the average daily trading volume for each of the three stocks in the three months of our sample
period.

On the buying side as shown in the first panel of Table 1, TLS has the largest average
undisclosed order size of approximately 230,000 shares during the sample period, accounting
for 1.3% of its average daily trading volume. NAB has the largest price movements as
reflected in the standard deviation of the price, while the mean size of the undisclosed order in
NAB only accounts for 0.85% of its average daily trading volume. This is however not the
case on the selling side. With the greatest price deviation of the three, though NAB has the
smallest mean size of 53,847 shares, it accounts for 1.92% of its average daily trading
volume, highest of the three. This suggests that the undisclosed On the buying side as shown
in the first panel of Table 1, TLS has the largest average undisclosed order size of
approximately 230,000 shares during the sample period, accounting for 1.3% of its average
daily trading volume. NAB has the largest price movements as reflected in the standard
deviation of the price, while the mean size of the undisclosed order in NAB only accounts for
0.85% of its average daily trading volume. This is however not the case on the selling side.
With the greatest price deviation of the three, though NAB has the smallest mean size of
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53,847 shares, it accounts for 1.92% of its average daily trading volume, highest of the three.
This suggests that the undisclosed orders are used more on the selling of NAB then the
purchasing of it. On the contrary, the opposite is true for TLS, for the mean size of the
undisclosed order only accounts for 0.87% of its average trading volume, as opposed to 1.3%
on the purchasing side.
3.

The Model for Undisclosed Orders
To examine the factors that determine the size of undisclosed orders, we consider the

following two aspects. First, several studies have tested the interaction between trading
volume and price volatility at constant data frequency interval4. For intra-day data at order
level, the trading volume of a trade is actually the order size. To capture the potential impact
of volatility on the size of undisclosed orders, the model incorporates in the short-term and
long-term price volatility variables that are measured as the absolute price change from the
last five minutes before the order submission, and from the close-price on the previous day,
respectively. This can be expressed in the following equations as:
∆ p5min = Ln (Pm / P5min )

(1)

ABS ( ∆ p5min ) = | ∆ p5min |

(2)

∆ pclose = Ln ( Pm / Pclose )

(3)

ABS (∆ pclose ) = | ∆ pclose |

(4)

Secondly, many authors have addressed the issue of the information content of liquidity.
Essentially, liquidity is associated with frequent trading at low costs. Previous studies have
used the bid/ask spread and the difference between daily high and low to proxy for it. In this
context, liquidity is associated with the number of orders that are executed within a certain
period of time5 with no significant price changes in the stock. The total trading volume from
the start of the trading day to the time spot when an undisclosed order is submitted for the
stock is thus calculated to compare with the average level of this measure across the previous
30 trading days. The change of liquidity on the day of submission from its average level is an
indicator of whether there is new information existing on the market before an undisclosed
order is submitted. This is an important factor which may affect the brokers’ use of
undisclosed orders. In formulation, the change of liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquidity
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at time before the submission of the undisclosed order to the average value of liquidity from
opening to the same time across last 30 days. For example, if the ratio for this undisclosed
order entered at 11:00 am in stock k is 1.5, it means that there is 50% more volume traded
today by 11:00 am than normal days, indicating the possibility of new information on the
market. This ratio of change in liquidity is expressed in equation (5) as:

∆L =

Trading Volume up at tx of the day
V
= x
Average Trading Volume at tx over 30 days Vx

(5)

As a supplement, the total volume of undisclosed orders entered in the last 5 trading days
before the submission of current undisclosed order on bid and ask side (UZtbid and UZtask),
respectively, are also included to test the existence of market information in the longer term.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue that the informed traders always tend to trade in large
volume. So if the total volume of the undisclosed orders submitted to either buy or sell a stock
during the past five trading days are large, it appears that there has been new public
information or informed trading in this stock. In order to conform with other variables in the
model, these two variables are then normalised by the stock’s average daily volume calculated
over the past 30 trading days,
 ∑UZ tbid
= Ln
 V
daily







(6)

 ∑Voltask
TVt ask = Ln
 V
daily







(7)

TVt

bid

As we use intra-day data sets at order level, the price and volume measures suggest certain
patterns during different time of the day. For example, Wood, Mclinsh and Ord (1985) have
found an asymmetric U-shaped pattern in price series across the trading day on the NYSE.
Chan Christie and Schultz (1995) observe a similar pattern in trading volume, with larger
trading volume at the opening and closing of the trading day. To eliminate this diurnal effect,
the time-of-the-day dummies are calculated based on the number of shares submitted in
undisclosed orders as a percentage of the average daily trading volume of the stock. First, in
our sample that only includes undisclosed orders and variables associated with those
undisclosed orders, at order i we calculate the ratio of As we use intra-day data sets at order
level, the price and volume measures suggest certain patterns during different time of the day.
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For example, Wood, Mclinsh and Ord (1985) have found an asymmetric U-shaped pattern in
price series across the trading day on the NYSE. Chan Christie and Schultz (1995) observe a
similar pattern in trading volume, with larger trading volume at the opening and closing of the
trading day. To eliminate this diurnal effect, the time-of-the-day dummies are calculated
based on the number of shares submitted in undisclosed orders as a percentage of the average
daily trading volume of the stock. First, in our sample that only includes undisclosed orders
and variables associated with those undisclosed orders, at order i we calculate the ratio of the
total number of shares entered from order one to order i to th stock’s average daily trading
volume. As the order number goes from one to i, i+1, …, n from the start of the day, this ratio
increases upwards across the trading day. Then four dummy variables are identified that
differentiate the time when the total number of the undisclosed orders account for respectively
30%, 40%, 50% and 60% of the stock’s daily volume. For example, if it is the case that by
10:37:04 am the total number of undisclosed orders account for 30% of the stock’s daily
volume, so all undisclosed orders submitted from the start of the trading day to that time have
the first dummy variable equal to one, whilst the value of the other three dummy variables are
zero for this stock. The other three dummy variables are identified in the similar manner, say,
if it is at 03:12:17 pm that the total number of undisclosed orders submitted account for 60%
of the stock’s daily volume, then all undisclosed orders submitted after that time have values
of all four dummy variables equal to zero.
It is natural to see that the institutional investors and major brokers who often deal with
block trades have been the frequent users of undisclosed orders. A great deal of research6 has
examined the price behaviour associated with the disclosed limit orders in large size orders
(block trades) submitted by these traders. It is commonly found that, in order to either avoid
high market impact cost, or hide the information advantage they may possess, brokers often
break up a large order into a series of moderate size orders. Barclay and Warner (1993) have
undertaken research in this regard and propose the “stealth trading” hypothesis that medium
size trades drive price movements the most. However, there are brokers and institutional
investors’ whose behaviour associated with undisclosed orders has not been investigated. It is
suspected that they might also break up a large undisclosed order into a series of moderate
size undisclosed orders. If they use the same strategy when submitting their undisclosed
orders, then the undisclosed orders submitted consecutively during the course of trading
should be somehow correlated. Therefore, an autoregressive moving average (ARMA)
framework is applicable in this case to determine the size of the undisclosed order based on its

9
lags. The significance level of the estimated coefficients will also tell whether brokers use the
same ‘breaking-up’ strategy in undisclosed orders as in disclosed limit orders.
The ARMA model employed here is slightly different in its autoregressive (AR) term,
the lagged size of the undisclosed orders. Due to the fact that one large undisclosed order is
broken up by the same broker and the broken-up orders are therefore more likely to be
correlated if they are submitted by the same broker, the AR terms in the model, or the lags of
the size of undisclosed orders, are those lags of undisclosed orders submitted by the same
broker who enters the current undisclosed order. As each broker has a broker I.D. attached to
the order he/she submits in our sample data, it is possible to identify the orders that are
submitted by the same broker. For each observation in the dependent variable series, we track
10 trading days back from the current order to find the last undisclosed order submitted by
this broker in the same stock, and another 20 trading days to find our second ‘lag’ in the same
way. The intuition behind this is that if the broker breaks up a large undisclosed order into a
series of smaller undisclosed orders and submits them in sequence t1, t2,… tn, then orders
submitted at tn-i, (i = 1, 2, …, n-1) should be related to the order submitted at tn. Only the
latest two lags are included in the model as the t-statistic for longer lags is not statistically
significant.
An ARMA model which has incorporated the above-described factors is presented in
Equation 6. These factors include price volatility, liquidity, new information, the time of the
day and the stockbrokers’ behaviour:
UV t = c + α 1U V t ′−1 + α 2U V t ′− 2 + β 1ε t −1 + β 2 ε t − 2 + γ ∆ L + ϕ | ∆ p 5 min | + θ | ∆ p close |
+δ

bid

TV t bid + δ

ask

TV t ask +

4

∑

k =1

ρ kbid D k

(8)

The dependent variable UVt is the normalised order volume of the tth undisclosed order
entered:
 Undis.Volt
UVt = Ln
 V
daily







(9)

UV’t-1 and UV’t-2 are the first two orders of autoregressive (AR) term, while εt-1 and εt-2 are the
first two orders of moving average (MA) term. ∆L represents the change in liquidity as
calculated in Equation (5). TVtAsk and TVtBid are the normalised cumulated volume of
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undisclosed orders as calculated in Equation (6) and (7). The parameters of equation (8) are
estimated with results provided in the next section.
4.

Estimation Results
The empirical estimation is implemented for three major Australian stocks that are

considered to be most frequently traded in terms of undisclosed orders. They are TLS
(telecommunications), BHP (resources) and NAB (banking) all listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange.
4.1

ADF Test for Stationarity
As time series studies require that all variables have to be stationary to assure the

validity of conventional statistical tests, unit root tests are first applied to test the order of
integration of the data. Table 2 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests for a unit root. The ADF tests have null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary with a
unit root. Different lag lengths are chosen based on the number of observations obtained for
each stock. The ADF t-statistic for all variables indicates a rejection of the null of nonstationarity, with most of the coefficients being significant at 99% confident level.
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Variables
UVt
UV’t-1
UV’t-2
V

x

/V

x

CV Bid
CV Ask
| ∆ p5min |

| ∆ pclose |

TLS
-5.39***
-5.21***
-5.44***
-4.19***
-4.01***
-4.44***
-6.31***

BHP
-3.91***
-3.31**
-3.01**
-4.29***
-3.36**
-5.23***
-4.49***

NAB
-3.95***
-3.59***
-3.45**
-2.81*
-3.18**
-3.60***
-3.51**

-4.54***

-3.72***

-2.91*

-3.54
-2.91
-2.59

-3.56
-2.92
-2.60

Critical Values for the rejection of null hypothesis:
1%
5%
10%

-3.45
-2.87
-2.57

Notes: the table presents the ADF statistics with intercept and not trend as well as the associated
Mackinnon (1991) critical values for all variables of three stocks, with a significant level of 90%
expressed by ***, 95% expressed by ** and 99% expressed by *. A different number of lags is
chosen for each stock based on the number of observations, TLS: 4 lags, BHP: 2 lags and NAB: 1
lag.
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4.2

Results from the ARMA Model
The estimation results from the ARMA model in Equation (8) for the three stocks are

presented in Table 3 with R2 statistics and residual tests of autocorrelation and
Heteroscedasticity also reported. First, it is noticed that the two modified autoregressive lags
are strongly statistically significant at a 95% confident level for all stocks, and the first
moving averages lag is significant for two stocks. This means that the past orders’ size is
explanatory in terms of the size of the current order submitted by the same broker. This
provides evidence that even with undisclosed orders, brokers also use a series of medium
sized orders rather than one big size order to buy or sell a stock. It conforms with our
assumption that when trading with undisclosed orders, brokers also prefer to break their large
orders into several smaller size ones. This conforms with the empirical findings of Barclay
and Warner (1993) and their “stealth trading” hypothesis.
Second, the absolute price change variables that represent short-term and long-term
price volatility make a varying contribution to the sample stocks. The absolute price change 5
minutes prior to the submission, |∆p5min|, is statistically significant in the explanation of the
order size for NAB, but it fails to explain the variation in order size for BHP. The coefficient
θ for long-term absolute price change has a negative sign, implying a negative dependence of
undisclosed order size and the long-term price volatility. Berkman (1996) argues that limit
orders are fully displayed to provide free options to other market participants, and the
undisclosed limit orders reduce the value of free options. Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001)
reported that the option value of limit orders, and thus the use of undisclosed orders that
reduces this option value, is expected to increase in volatility. Our finding is consistent with
this positive relationship between the reduction of option value and volatility only on a shortterm basis. However, neither of these two volatility measures provide significant explanatory
power for the order size for TLS, instead, the change of liquidity, ∆L, is shown to be
significant for this stock.
Third, the cumulative trading volume in undisclosed orders during the past 5 days on
either side significantly contributes to the variation of the order size for all three stocks. This
suggests that the undisclosed order submission is likely to be part of an informed trading
process, given that the large undisclosed trading volume in the past five days affects the size
of current undisclosed order. The time-of-the-day effect only has a significant impact on one
of the three stocks.
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Table 3: Estimation Results of the ARMA Model for TLS, BHP and NAB
TLS
Coefficient Std. Error
c

(0.35)
(0.06)

BHP
Coefficient Std.
Error
-2.667**
(1.14)
0.323**
(0.16)

NAB
Coefficient Std. Error

α1

-1.836***
0.464***

α2

0.251***

(0.06)

0.321**

(0.14)

0.326**

(0.14)

β1

0.070

(0.06)

-0.623***

(0.16)

0.990***

(0.00)

β2

-0.081

(0.06)

-0.531***

(0.15)

-

γ

0.182**

(0.07)

0.314

(0.32)

0.130

(0.24)

ϕ

0.314

(0.38)

-

3.636**

(1.51)

θ

-0.051

(0.08)

-0.351

-0.141

(0.13)

(0.25)

-1.168
0.577***

(0.99)
(0.12)

-

δ

Bid

-0.047

(0.05)

0.264**

(0.14)

0.292

(0.19)

δ

Ask

0.086**

(0.05)

0.132

(0.21)

-0.280***

(0.09)

ρ1

0.058

(0.31)

1.332***

(0.43)

0.313

(0.99)

ρ2

0.146

(0.19)

0.146

(0.44)

0.278

(0.18)

ρ3

0.132

(0.18)

1.034***

(0.26)

0.228

(0.21)

ρ4

0.067

(0.18)

-

R-Squared
Adjusted
R-Squared
Q-Statistic
(Residuals)

Q-Statistic
(Squared Residuals)

-

-

-

55.91%

50.88%

76.86%

53.92%

45.88%

70.33%

5.024 (54.1%)

7.196 (30.3%)

7.430 (38.5%)

4.910 (55.5%)

4.461 (61.5%)

2.069 (95.6%)

Notes: the table presents estimation results for equation (8):
4

UV t = c + α 1UVt′−1 + α 2UVt′− 2 + β 1ε t −1 + βε t − 2 + γ∆L + ϕ | ∆p 5 min | +θ | ∆p close | +δ bid TV t bid + δ ask TV t ask + ∑ ρ kbid D k
k =1

where the second last row reports the Ljung-Box Q-statistics and their p-values at lag 5 that tests statistic for the
null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order 5. The last row shows the adjusted R2 values as a
supplementation to the R2. The adjusted R2 is computed as: 1 − ( 1 − R ) 2 ( T − 1 ) /( T − k ) .

As far as the goodness of fit statistics are concerned, the R2 and the adjusted R2 are
provided at the bottom part of Table 3. The R2 measures the success of the regression in
predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample. It is the fraction of the
variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. The results in
Table 3 show that the R2 statistic of the ARMA model is generally satisfying for all three
stocks. For instance, NAB has a goodness of fit of about 77%, implying that the model has
explained 77% of the variation in the dependent variable.
However, one problem with using R2 as a measure of goodness of fit is that it will never
decrease as more independent variables are added. The adjusted R2, denoted as R 2 , penalizes
the R2 for the addition of independent variables that do not contribute to the explanatory
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power of the model, so the R 2 is never larger than the R2. The variables are included in the
model estimation based on the criterion that the inclusion of each variable increases R 2 . For
example, as it is found that the inclusion of the second lag of the MA term (εt-2) in stock NAB
decreases the value of R 2 (though it increases the value of R2), this variable is not used in
estimating parameters for stock NAB. Similarly, the fourth time-of-the-day dummy variable is
not included in the estimation of BHP and NAB because the addition of it decreases R 2 in
these two stocks. With the problem of redundant variables solved, the adjusted R 2 for all
three stocks remains 70% for NAB, 54% for TLS and 46% for BHP, which verifies the ability
of the ARMA model and all independent variables to explain the variability of the dependent
variable – the size of undisclosed orders.
Finally, to test the specification of the model and the validity of the coefficients
estimated, in the last two rows of Table 3 the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the residual series and
the squared residuals are presented with their p-values in parentheses. The Q-statistic at lag k
is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. For all
three stocks, we fail to reject the null up to order 8 for residual series and squared residuals.
This implies that there is no serial correlation or Heteroscedasticity (ARCH effects) in the
residual series of the ARMA model.

5.

Conclusion
Stock Exchanges that adopt electronic order book systems rely on limit orders as a

major source of liquidity. Under such an automatic order matching system traders are
encouraged to show their order information to attract other market participants. However, the
traders who submit limit orders are exposed to various risks and disadvantages, especially
when the order volume of concern is large. To help traders control for their order exposure,
some markets, for example, the ASX, give traders the option to hide the quantity of their limit
orders, provided that the total value of the order is beyond a threshold. In an ARMA
framework, this paper focusses on investigating the features of this type of limited orders,
identifying the factors that affect the size of them, and examining the trading behaviour of
investors in using undisclosed orders as an alternative trading means on the equity market.
The findings of this paper suggest that both price volatility and the change in liquidity
have an impact on the size of the undisclosed order submitted. But the degree of contribution
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of these factors may vary from one stock to another. The use of the undisclosed orders
increases in short-term volatility across stocks, but this is not the case for the long-term
horizon. The size of undisclosed orders submitted is affected by the large trading volume on
either side in the past 5 trading days before the order submission, suggesting that the
submission of undisclosed orders is related to informed trading. Therefore, the appearance of
an undisclosed order in a stock may provide a signal of the possibility that there is a new
information event on the market.
More importantly, this paper has also shed light on the behaviour of brokers in
submitting undisclosed orders. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) suggest that rather than put it
directly into the market as a whole, block traders and institutional investors prefer to break up
a large order into a series of medium size orders and trade them in a sequence of time. If they
use the same strategy when using undisclosed orders, then the orders submitted by the same
broker during the sequence of trading should be found correlated. Given the substantially
significant coefficients of AR and MA lags in the model, we can see strong correlation
between the size of the undisclosed orders submitted by the same broker, providing evidence
to support the ‘package trading’ hypothesis for undisclosed orders. Therefore, No matter
whether the concern is with disclosed or undisclosed limit orders, block traders always prefer
to break up a large order into several moderate size orders and then submit them in a sequence
of time.
Owing to the restraints in data availability, especially the broker id used to identify the
brokers, the investigation of stock brokers’ behaviour in using undisclosed orders is still at an
early stage. This paper has only considered three Australian stocks; it would be interesting to
extend this research to a bigger sample of stocks, and to other stock markets.
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Notes
1.

For a review of literature, see Madhavan (1995, 1996), Gemmill (1994), Flood,
Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu (1999), Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2000),
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999, 2000).

2.

See Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) for more details in this respect.

3.

See Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986), Haris (1986) and Cornell (1981)

4.

See Barclay and Warner (1993), Flectcher (1995), etc.

5.

See Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994).

6.

See Chan and Lakonishok (1993a, b), Lakonishok, et al (1992), Kraus and Stroll (1972)
and Madhavan and smidt (1991), etc.

16

References
Aitken, M., Brown, P. & Walter T. 1996, ‘Infrequent Trading and Firm Size as Explanations
for the Intra-Day Patterns in Returns on SEATS’, working paper, Securities Industry
Research Centre of Asia-Pacific.
Aitken, M., Berkman H. & Mak, D. 2001, ‘The Use of Undisclosed Limit Orders on the
Australian Stock Exchange’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, pp. 1589-1603.
Barclay, J. & Warner, J. 1993, ‘Stealth Trading and Volatility: which Trades Moves Prices?’,
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 34, pp. 281-305.
Berkman, H. 1996, ‘Large Option Trades, Market Makers, and Limit Orders’, Review of
Financial Studies, vol. 9, pp. 977-1002.
Biais, B. 1993, ‘Price Formation And Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized
Markets’, Journal of Finance, vol. 48, pp. 157-184.
Black, F. 1971, ‘Towards a Fully Automated Exchange, First Part’, Financial Analysts
Journal, vol. 27, pp. 29-34.
Bloomfield, R. & O’Hara, M. 1999, ‘Market Transparency: Who Wins and Who Loses?’, The
Review of Financial Studies’, vol. 12, pp. 5-35.
Bloomfield, R. & O’Hara, M. 1999, ‘Can Transparent Markets Survive?’, Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 55, pp. 425-459.
Chan, L. & Lakonishok, J. 1993, ‘Institutional Trades and Intra-Day Stock Price Behaviour’,
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33, pp. 173-200.
Chan, L. & Lakonishok, J. 1995, ‘The Behaviour of Stock Prices Around Institutional
Trades’, Journal of Finance, vol. 50, pp. 1147-1174.
Chan, C. & Lakonishok, J. 1993, ‘Institutional Trades and Intra-Day Stock Price Behaviour’,
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33, pp. 173-190.
Chan, C., W. Christie & Schultz, P. 1995, ‘Market Structure and the Intra-ay Pattern of the
bid-Ask Spreads for NASDAQ Securities’, Journal of Business, vol. 68, pp. 35-60.
Cornell, B. 1981, ‘The Relationship between Volume and Price Variability in Futures
Markets’, the Journal of Futures Markets, vol. 1, pp. 303-316.
D’Hondt, C. Winne, R. & Francois-Heude, A. 2001, ‘Hidden Orders: An Empirical Study on
the French Segment of Euro.NM’, working Paper, Facultés Universités Catholiques de
Mons.
Easley, D. & O’Hara M.1987, ‘Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets’,
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 19, pp. 69-90.

17

Easley, D. & O’Hara, M. 1992, ‘Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment’, Journal
of Finance, vol. 47, pp. 577-605.
Easley, D., Kiefer, N., O’Hara, M. & Papermen, J. 1996 ‘Liquidity, Information, and
Infrequently Traded Stocks’, Journal of Finance, vol. 51, pp. 1405-1436.
Engle, R. & Russell, J. 1998, ‘Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model for
Irregularly Space Transaction Data’, Econometrica, vol. 66, pp. 1127-1162.
Fletcher, R. 1995, ‘The Role of Information and the Time Between Trades: An Empirical
Investigation’, Journal of Financial Research, vol. 18, pp. 239-260.
Flood, M., Huisman, R., Koedijk, K. & Mahieu, R. 1999, ‘Quote Disclosure and Price
Discovery in Multiple-Dealer Financial Markets’, The Review of Financial Studies, vol.
12, pp. 37-59.
Gemmill, G. 1994, ‘Transparency And Liquidity: A Study of Block Trades on the London
Stock Exchange under Different Publication Rules’, working paper, City University of
London.
Harris, L. 1986, ‘Cross-Security Tests of the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis’, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 32, pp. 39-46.
Harris, L. 1997, ‘Order Exposure and Parasitic Traders’, Working Paper, Marshall School of
Business, University of Southern California.
Harris, L. & Hasbrouck J. 1996, ‘Market vs. Limit Orders: The Super DOT Evidence on
Order Submission Strategy’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 31,
pp. 213-232.
Jones, M., Kaul, G. & Lipson, M. 1994, ‘Transactions, Volume and Volatility’, Review of
Financial Studies, vol. 7, pp. 631-651.
Keim, B. & Madhavan, A. 1995, ‘Anatomy of the Trading Process: Empirical Evidence on
the Behaviour of Institutional Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 37, pp.
371-398.
Keim, D. & Madhavan, A. 1996, ‘The Upstairs Market for Large Block Transactions:
Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects’, Review of Financial Studies, vol. 9, pp. 136.
Kraus, A. & Stoll, H. 1972, ‘Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock
Exchange’, Journal of Finance, vol. 27, pp. 569-588.
Kyle, S. 1985, ‘Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading’, Econometric, vol. 53, p. 13151335.
Lakonishok, J., Ritter, R. & Chopra, N. 1992, ‘Measuring Abnormal Performance: Do Stocks
Overreact?’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 31, pp. 235-269.

18

Lyons, R. 1994, ‘Optimal Transparency in a Dealership Market with an Application to
Foreign Exchange’, working paper, University of California, Berkley.
MacKinnon, J. 1991, Long-run Economic Relationships: Readings in Cointegration, ed. R.
Engle and C. Granger, Oxford University Press.
Madhavan, A. 1995, ‘Consolidation, Fragmentation and the Disclosure of Trading
Information’, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 8, pp. 579-603.
Madhavan, A. 1996, ‘Security Prices and Market Transparency’, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, vol. 5, pp. 255-283.
Madhavan, A. & Smidt, S. 1991, ‘A Bayesian Model of Intra-Day Specialist Pricing, Journal
of Financial Economics, vol. 30, pp. 99-134.
Madhavan, A., Porter, D. & Weaver, D. 2000, ‘Should Securities Markets Be Transparent?’,
working paper, University of Southern California.
O’Hara, M. 1995, ‘Market Microstructure Theory’, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge.
Richardson, G., Sefcik, S. & Thompson, R 1986, ‘A Test of Dividend Irrelevance Using
Volume Reaction to a Change in Dividend Policy’, Journal of Financial Economics,
vol. 17, pp. 313-333.
Wood, A., McInish, T. & Ord, J. 1985, ‘An Investigation of Transactions Data for NYSE
Stocks’, Journal of Finance, vol. 40, pp. 723-741.

